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Introduction
In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, there has been increasing interna-
tional concern, particularly amongst Western states, with securing global liberal peace
(Fukuyama 1992; Mandelbaum 2002). Since this normative goal was laid out compre-
hensively in the UN’s Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali1992), a wealth of theoretical
and policy-based thinking has emerged on how to end the ‘internal’ wars of the global
South. New strategies, practices and research disciplines have proliferated, including
facilitative efforts such as ‘conflict resolution’, ‘conflict transformation’ and ‘peace-
building’ on the one hand and hard-power interventions under logics such as ‘humani-
tarian’ protection, ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states and even ‘state building’ on the other.
However, despite years of research, analysis and praxis, it is clear that there is a
huge gap between the continuing ‘grim reality’ of persistent intra-state wars, and what
international interventions in them have been capable of delivering (Ropers 2008).
Nonetheless, the prevailing philosophy, theory and practice of liberal peacebuilding
has remained largely unchanged. This is despite research such as the Joint Utstein
Study of Peacebuilding (Smith 2004) and the work of Goetchel and Hagmann (2008),
which point out several deficiencies in contemporary peacebuilding strategies, includ-
ing inconsistent understandings of ‘peace’ itself; overly optimistic policy designs; in-
terveners’ inability to adapt to changing conflict dynamics; prescriptive and instru-
mentalist logics; a lack of ‘local’ involvement and so on.
It is in this context that systemic approaches to conflict analysis promise greater ef-
ficacy in the study of protracted conflicts and, thus in the shaping, strategizing and
planning of appropriate peace interventions. Certainly, with their strong emphasis on
holistic considerations of conflict systems, these approaches arguably ought to be more
productive than those which focus more narrowly – say, on war economies (Col-
lier2000; Berdal/Malone 2000), ‘poverty’ (Brainard/Chollet 2007), or restoring ‘secu-
rity’ i.e. counter-terrorism (Byman et al. 2001). However, the focus here is on how
analysis in general, and systemic analysis in particular, nonetheless needs to guard
against inadvertently reproducing prevailing orthodoxies, especially when it informs,
and is informed by, unfolding international interventions to end a given conflict.
We make three interrelated arguments here. Firstly, despite their considerable
promise, systemic approaches are no less likely than conventional analyses to be
shaped by the analyst’s own value-judgments, doctrinal assumptions and what Peter
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Senge (1990) terms ‘mental models’.1 Conventional approaches, including those listed
above, often spring explicitly from the tenets and assumptions of liberal peace, a par-
ticular conception of peace that has become taken-for-granted in international peace-
building. These analytical approaches tend to take a mechanistic, even if supposedly
research driven, approach to understanding conflicts, as well as the possibilities and
bases for external interventions in them. Crucially, these approaches fail to account for,
let alone critically question, the analyst’s own subjective value judgments in arriving at
analytical conclusions which then inform, drive and sustain policy. Systemic analysis is
not immune to this weakness and must therefore also be undertaken with considerable
care and critical self-reflection. To be clear, we are not saying analysts’ values are nec-
essarily ‘wrong’, invalid or inappropriate, but that these values can profoundly shape
(or distort) analysts’ perceptions of the dynamics of a conflict and the actors involved.
We also argue that when informed by the tenets and assumptions of liberal peace, a
systemic intervention is unlikely to produce results different to a more conventional
approach.
Secondly, analysis must situate international actors – including those intervening
for peace and those analysing conflict for this purpose – as an integral part of the con-
flict system, rather than as one-step-removed ‘externals’. Instead of belonging to a dis-
tinct ‘outside’ environment, foreign actors pursuing peace, especially states, are often
already embedded in the conflict in various capacities: as providers of aid and military
assistance to the state or non-state actors, as backers of some political parties and spon-
sors of selected civil society groups, and so on.
As such, they are internal to the conflict system, affecting its dynamics through
their routine actions. International strategies of ‘conflict transformation’, ‘peacebuild-
ing’ or ‘state-building’ are powerful interventions seeking to actively shape conflict
sites towards a future that the interveners consider an appropriate one. Often pursued
through tools such as sanctions, incentives and conditionalities (Griffiths/Barnes 2008),
these interventions alter a conflict site in myriad unpredictable ways that are often ne-
glected by analysts predisposed to see conflict systems as largely ‘internal’ to the
country in question.
Moreover, as an agent informing, and thus shaping, external interventions, the
analyst must recognize he or she is, just like other intervening actors, clearly internal,
not external, to the system under study. To do otherwise risks systemic thinking arriv-
ing at conclusions which, especially when appearing ‘commonsensical’ at the time,
serve to legitimate the rationales and actions of powerful actors, both internal and ex-
ternal, and de-legitimate those of weaker ones. The question then, as Oliver Richmond
(2007) points out, is not ‘how peace?’, but ‘whose peace?’ Dichotomies such as ‘in-
sider-partial/outsider-neutral,’ taken-for-granted in peace and conflict studies are based
on erroneous assumptions about a conflict’s dynamics and the range of actors involved
in it.
Thirdly, ‘analysis’ cannot be a one-off exercise conducted ahead of intervention,
but must remain an ongoing process, one that closely follows the evolving dynamics of
                                                          
1 As Ropers (2008, 8) succinctly puts it, mental models are broadly conceived of as ways of “capturing how an
individual or group makes sense of its environment.” In that sense, as discussed later, this paper is focussed
on the mental models of conflict analysts rather than protagonists.
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the conflict system and interventions in it. What we mean here is this: not only should
results of interventions be evaluated against the analysis that informed them, but that
analysis itself must be revisited to incorporate the outcomes of intervention. For exam-
ple, if sanctions applied to change conflict parties’ behaviour instead produces resis-
tance, the logic of that resistance should feed into renewed analysis of the conflict sys-
tem, and not just into evaluation of international policy implementation (i.e. how the
desired behaviour can yet be brought about – say, by intensified sanctions). Is resis-
tance to a particular ‘solution’ the same as resistance to ‘compromise’ or to ‘peace’ it-
self? Does the analysis accurately account for the specific rationale of that resistance?
The same goes for conflict actors’ willing compliance with international desires and
demands: are they embracing a shared vision of peace, or simply playing to interna-
tional expectations while advancing their original goals through new strategies in new
circumstances? In either case, why? In short, given that the dynamics of conflict sites
are not static or settled, neither therefore should be analytical conclusions.
Drawing on the 2001-2006 Norwegian-led international intervention to end Sri
Lanka’s protracted ethnopolitical conflict, we show how analysis can reproduce taken-
for-granted (mis)understandings of the conflict. Prevailing international attitudes to Sri
Lanka had long held the conflict to be fundamentally linked to one of two competing,
extreme goals – a unitary state and two separate states. Hence, in 2001 federalism was
posited by key members of the international community, and their local counterparts,
as the ‘ideal’, even obvious, solution.2 As argued below, the idea of federalism as a
self-evident solution to Sri Lanka’s crisis is rooted in the tenets and assumptions of lib-
eral peace, and was determinedly pursued with minimal regard to local perceptions and
articulations. To be clear, we are not saying federalism is not a solution; but rather that
how this idea was arrived at sprang from a set of assumptions, which then drove inter-
national policies on how to pursue a federal solution. For example, once federalism be-
came the ‘obvious’ solution, actors in the conflict system became easily categorized as
either ‘pro-peace’ or ‘anti-peace’ primarily on their acceptance of, or resistance to, fed-
eralism. International incentives and sanctions were applied accordingly, drastically
changing the balances of power within the conflict system.
What was crucially ignored in the analysis was why some actors were opposing
federalism, and indeed, why others were supporting it (the importance of this lacuna is
underlined, as we show, by how many of the then ‘pro-peace’ actors subsequently also
rejected federalism). In other words, what was not taken seriously, even if sometimes
noted or inventoried, were the competing logics informing inter-communal relations
and forming the root of conflict and violence. We suggest that had the analysis been
undertaken with a focus on the ongoing process of ending conflict – rather than a spe-
cific outcome (i.e. a specific ‘solution’) – as well as the shifting power differentials
between local and international actors, and the powerful influence of the prevailing lib-
eral peace orthodoxy, the inevitability of the fiasco that later unfolded in Sri Lanka
would have been apparent.
                                                          
2 For example, a statement on ‘The need for a national debate on the federal idea’ issued by the Centre for
Policy alternatives (CPA), a leading liberal/neoliberal Sri Lankan think-tank, on behalf of 1,000 delegates of
25 organisations who met in Colombo on Feb 6, 2006, pointed out: “we believe […] that a federal Constitu-
tion offers a reasonable accommodation or compromise in a conflict where one side is committed to a unitary
state and the other a separate state.”
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Our contribution proceeds thus: In the next section we outline what we mean by
‘systemic thinking’. Amid the different schools of thought (see discussion in Ropers
2008), we take systemic thinking not as a methodology or tool but an analytical ap-
proach, a ‘way of thinking’. We also critically discuss what is often taken-for-granted
about conflict in developing states (i.e. that it is an ‘internal’ phenomenon) and ‘peace’
(i.e. that this is self-evidently ‘liberal peace’), as well as noting some of the flawed as-
sumptions that flow directly from these conceptions. In the following section we dis-
cuss the practices of abstraction and assumption necessary and inherent to analysis and
the centrality of analysts’ own ‘mental models’ to their work. In both sections, we il-
lustrate our arguments with reference to the Norwegian-led international intervention
in Sri Lanka, especially the identification of federalism as the ‘ideal’ solution to the
protracted conflict there. We conclude with some qualified suggestions.
1. Thinking About Conflict Systems
To begin with, we see systemic thinking, after Danny Burns (cited in Neuwei-
ler/Körppen 2008, 31), as an ‘attitude’ which informs how we approach analysis of
conflict systems, how we discern ‘causes’, how we conceptualize ‘solutions’, how we
include or exclude aspects, factors, actors and issues, and, above all, how as analysts
we position ourselves in the conflict system. Drawing on earlier work by Berghof
Peace Support (Wils et al. 2006; Ropers 2008), our discussion is informed by aspects
of systems thinking that draws on constructivist and cybernetics-based thought: the
centrality of system dynamics3, mental models and narratives4 and, in particular, sec-
ond order cybernetics. Unlike Norbert Wiener’s systemic approach (first order cyber-
netics) which sees the observer and observed as two distinct entities, Heinz von Foer-
ster (1974) and Gregory Batson (1972, 1979), pioneers of second order cybernetics,
emphasize the impossibility of ‘neutral’ observation i.e. how observers are, or become,
part of the system under observation. This is clearly so when analysis drives interven-
tionist policies and practices. Every observation of a system is itself an intervention in
it and there is no separation between the external (observer) and internal (observed)
actors, especially once interventions in the conflict system begin. In short, the com-
monly assumed category of ‘neutrality’ ascribed to the observer is thus untenable.
We recognize that systemic thinking, in particular second order cybernetics and
systems dynamics, can contribute to a better understanding of the complex conflict web
– which, as noted earlier, extends well beyond the territorial limits of the conflict state.
Systemic thinking urges analysts to look beyond the conflict’s self-evident dynamics
and to consider seriously local and international rationales and their interplays. Our
point, however, is that this does not necessarily happen. Thus, while recognizing the
                                                          
3 This concept brings to the fore that social processes function in a non-linear manner and are interconnected
through network structures and feed-back loops (i.e. circular causality – see Körppen/Ropers’ elaboration of
Basic Principles of Systemic Thinking in Neuweiler/Körppen 2008, 29).
4 Based on Senge’s approach (1990, also see discussion in Flood 1999), this recognizes the importance of dif-
ferent narratives and understandings of the conflict that often lead to controversies around root causes i.e.
‘conflict about conflict’.
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utility of systems thinking in comparison to other approaches, we also caution that it
must be undertaken with care and self-awareness on the part of the analysts if it is not
to end up simply making implicit the sometimes explicit assumptions of other methods
that systemic analysis seeks to improve upon.5
Such difficulties are exemplified by how conflicts such as that in Sri Lanka are
conceptualized at the outset: as ‘internal’ conflicts. As Mark Duffield (1998, 97; see
also Hettne 2001, 32) has pointed out, the term ‘internal’ or ‘intra-state’ war is itself
misleading. Not only have other states – neighbours or distant powers – often long
been involved in such conflicts, either indirectly, via proxies or favoured local actors
(including the state in question), or directly, but a variety of armed challengers to the
state have often relied on external linkages and global networks for the military, eco-
nomic and political sustenance of their projects, as has the conflict state itself. Moreo-
ver, as the burgeoning field of post-colonial scholarship makes clear, many of today’s
conflict sites, and interventions in them, are consequent to and sometimes shaped fun-
damentally by colonial experience. Sri Lanka is no exception, given that identities,
power-distributions and the structure of the state itself have been profoundly shaped by
centuries of European colonial rule and decades of post-independence international en-
gagement.6
With regard to system boundaries, this means so-called ‘externals’ are in fact very
much part of the conflict system. Firstly, this is exemplified by the discernible impact
of international practices such as the ‘War on Terror’ or global aid networks. In many
analyses these are reduced to merely the constraints they imposed or the opportunities
they made available to ‘local’ actors (as in ‘sanctions, conditionalities and incentives’),
rather than being understood in terms of the powerful system-wide influences these
externalities were having. Secondly, international actors are integral to a conflict sys-
tem in so far as they act in pursuit of their own values and perceived interests, often
building capacities and shaping ‘local’ dynamics towards ends they (externals) deem
the best outcome for conflict and its resolution. Crucially, for the discussion here,
many of the leading states and international financial institutions involved after 2002 in
producing ‘peace’ in Sri Lanka had already long been involved in the protracted and
high-intensity conflict there by providing support to the state, both material (financial,
developmental, military etc.) and intangible (political support, expert advice, training
etc.)7 These routine relationships with the state are important given that the character,
structure and conduct of the state are fundamental to understanding the conflict’s dy-
namics.
For convenience, however, we use ‘external’ and ‘international’ actors as inter-
changeable labels in relation to the conflict system. It is worth noting that even the
category ‘external actors’ or ‘international community’ needs to be disaggregated if
one is to make sense of the seemingly disjointed, uncoordinated or contradictory (see
                                                          
5 Indeed, there is no guarantee systemic analysis will automatically lead to strategies for effective intervention
in support of peace. On the contrary, due to the recognized dynamic nature of conflict, uncertainty, unpre-
dictability and unintended outcomes should be central assumptions of an analytical framework. Whilst it is
beyond the scope of this chapter, that this is usually not the case should raise serious questions about how far
‘peace’ can be strategized or steps to overcome conflict programmed.
6 From a post-colonial perspective, even these intervening states and their relationships to actors in conflict
sites like Sri Lanka have also been profoundly shaped by the colonial experience.
7 See for example Creekmore et al. (2009); Lunstead (2007).
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Goodhand/Klem 2005) actions of its members. Oliver Richmond notes that the term
‘international community’ itself indicates an important assumption “that there exists a
body of actors with sufficient consensus and will to be able to bring about peace in
conflict zones – according to how this community conceptualizes peace, of course”
(2007, 14). With regards to Sri Lanka’s conflict, we use the term ‘international com-
munity’ to refer primarily to the grouping of Western states (and Japan), and those non-
state actors associated with them, including intergovernmental organizations (such as
the World Bank), non-governmental organizations and other hybrid structures con-
cerned with a range of issues such as ‘human rights’, ‘development’, ‘peace’ and so on.
2. Liberal Peace
It should be recognized that international interventions in the global South in the last
two decades have pursued a largely Western liberal conception of peace, one which, as
is criticized (see Richmond 2007; Paris 2002), is rarely reflected on by its advocates
and practitioners. The essential elements of ‘liberal peace’ are (specific conceptions of)
peace, democracy and free markets – Mandelbaum (2002) characterizes these as “the
ideas that conquered the world” – or, as a key study on Sri Lanka endorsed by the
World Bank and other donors puts it, “liberal democracy and market sovereignty”
(Goodhand/Klem 2005). In this logic, not only does the combination of democracy and
free markets constitute the bar to future violent conflict (‘Liberal’), they are also the
means by which the ‘conflict-ridden’ societies of the global South are to divest them-
selves of their debilitating antagonisms and other lacks, and thereby attain a state of
perpetual peace (‘Peace’). Whilst a detailed dissection of liberal peace is beyond the
scope of this chapter, it is worth noting that the term embodies specific, and contest-
able, conceptions of ‘peace’, ‘democracy’ and ‘free markets’. It is also worth noting
that attempts to produce this ideal, for example in African locales, have perversely had
the reverse consequences to those envisioned (Willet 2005). Nonetheless, in the past
two decades, this transformatory logic has been embedded in countless policy docu-
ments and research analyses by Western states and their associated organizations, in-
stitutions and agencies to such an extent it has come to constitute the ‘commonsense’
of international intervention in Southern sites. This is especially so in instances of
bringing about transition from war to peace. As Roger Mac Ginty (2009, 52) notes,
“the manifestation of the liberal peace are most visible in situations of internationally supported
peacebuilding and post-war reconstruction. Here the levers of the liberal peace include: western
encouragement (or coercion) to reach a peace deal, direction in writing a new constitution, assis-
tance in establishing and advising political parties, a donors’ conference to fund and direct post-
war reconstruction, help in holding electoral contests […] programmes of capacity-building for
the state and civil society, the introduction of good governance targets and the attaching of eco-
nomic reform conditions to any reconstruction assistance.”
The Sri Lankan case is a classic example of how the liberal peace was followed in
myriad intervention strategies, including all of those listed above. Crucially, for the
discussion here, for many ‘externals’ – as well as ‘internal’ – proponents of liberal de-
mocracy and market sovereignty, federalism was seen as the ideal way to ultimately
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bring about ‘good governance’. In this context, it is worth noting, as Mac Ginty (2008,
143) points out, how a set of global power dynamics are embedded in the liberal peace:
“Liberal peace [is] the concept, condition and practice whereby leading states, international or-
ganisations and international financial institutions promote their version of peace through peace-
support interventions, control of financial architecture, support for state sovereignty and the in-
ternational status quo.”
Liberal peace turns on a specific ideal of the modern state, its citizen and its society
which, when established, is held to lead to the emergence of a peace in that country
and, once rendered ubiquitous, to a pacific, liberal world order. This has profound con-
sequences for how places like Sri Lanka are viewed from the outset. Most importantly,
even before the ‘internal’ dynamics of a conflict are looked at, the shape of what the fi-
nal ‘peace’ should be is already known: a single, liberal democratic state with a market
economy. Crucially, liberal peace requires the rejection of the primacy of ethnicity in
individuals’ interactions with each other and its replacement with a sense of civic citi-
zenship and a democratic ethos. In this logic, in societal terms, ‘Sri Lankans’ are held,
a priori, to constitute a single multi-ethnic national collective that has come to be frac-
tured along ethnic and/or religious lines due to past ethno-nationalist mobilization, as-
cent to state power of illiberal (in economic and political terms) parties and, of course,
protracted armed conflict. Producing liberal peace therefore means the erosion of eth-
nopolitical identities and the remobilizing of the members of such groupings into a sin-
gle multicultural and pluralist collective with a civic identity – one centred, moreover,
on a responsive and robust state equipped with democratic mechanisms for peacefully
resolving disputes.
This is taken for granted as both necessary and possible, despite very different ‘lo-
cal’ conceptions of the island’s human collectives and their relationships to each other.
‘Tamil’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘Sinhala’ are long-sedimented identities that inform, and are re-
produced by, local practices, including those of the state, myriad actors in ‘civil soci-
ety’, including the influential Buddhist clergy, business patterns, media reporting, etc.
The central contradiction at the heart of Sri Lanka’s protracted ethnic conflict is be-
tween two distinct political rationalities (Dean 1999) – or ‘ways of thinking’ – as to
what the basis for power-relations between the communities on the island should be
(Nadarajah 2010).8 While space precludes a detailed discussion, brief outlines are pre-
sented here. One political rationality, positing the Tamils and Sinhalese as both
‘founding races’ of the island (Wilson 2000), calls for equitable power-sharing be-
tween these collectives.9 For convenience, this is labelled ‘Tamil rationality’ here,
                                                          
8 The term ‘political rationality’, in contrast to ideology, philosophy, nationalism, and so on, reflects the con-
cept of a broad and long-standing political logic informing wide-ranging and even seemingly contradictory
decisions by political actors. A political rationality is “any form of calculation about political activity i.e.
about any activity which has as its objective the influence, appropriation, redistribution, allocation or mainte-
nance of powers of the government of the state or other organizations” (Dean 1999, 210). The concept is
drawn from the extensive work by scholars developing Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ (1991). See,
for example, Miller/Rose (1990), Rose/Miller (1992), Hindess (1993), Barry et al. (1996), Rose (1999),
Larner/Walters (2004).
9 This political rationality sees Tamils and Sinhalese as two equal (i.e. equally valuable), rights-bearing collec-
tives i.e. irrespective of whether these collectives are ‘races’, ‘peoples’, ‘nations’ etc., they are the same type,
are equally valuable and are the entities between which power should be shared (Rasaratnam 2009). This
thinking informed the platforms of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (which sought power-sharing at the centre
136 Luxshi Vimalarajah and Suthaharan Nadarajah
though it is noted that many others, including some Sinhalese, share this thinking,
while some Tamils do not. The other rationality which has informed the conduct of the
Sri Lankan state and Sinhala polity since independence conceives the island as the pre-
serve of the Sinhala people, which are held to be its original inhabitants, and the Tamils
as late arrivals (De Votta 2007; see also Krishna 1999; Bartholomeusz/De Silva 1998;
Kapferer 1988).10 For convenience, this is labelled ‘Sinhala-Buddhist rationality’ here,
though it is shared by many others, including some ‘internationals’, but not some Sin-
halese. Indeed, it can be argued that the conflict itself constitutes efforts to render per-
manent and unchallengeable one or other of the competing ordering of relations be-
tween these collectives (Nadarajah 2010).
Crucial to understanding Sri Lanka’s conflict is that these competing conceptions,
which position the island’s collective identities in different relations to each other, are
deeply embedded in everyday life. Not only do they inform the practices, rituals and
doctrine of the state, they cleave party politics, civil society activity and media (Or-
jouela 2003; De Votta 2004; Nadarajah 2005). As Danny Burns argues, it is important
to look at both formal and informal levels of the conflict system and “to make central
what happens in the corridors, the pubs and children’s play spaces, to engage with so-
cial norms and to surface flows of power” (2007, 39). However, in much conflict
‘analysis’ undertaken in service of liberal peace, those local articulations which appear
not to accord with its tenets are dismissed wholesale, without serious interrogation of
their origins, bases or logics, as ‘illiberal’ and problematic ‘nationalisms’.11 Conse-
quently, the ceaseless reproduction of these identity-relations or hierarchies through
myriad, widespread and sedimented daily practices, and hence their resilience to liberal
peacebuilding, are therefore rarely foregrounded in analysis. Rather, focus is directed
towards the relative strengths of those actors seen as problematic for liberal peace.12
Just as crucial is how ‘the state’ is consequently conceptualized in analyses of ‘in-
ternal’ conflict. For liberal peace, a conflict state is a territorialized social container lo-
cated on a continuum between anarchy and collapse on one the hand and a perfect
market democracy on the other. Producing ‘lasting peace’ therefore entails moving the
state in question further towards this ideal through a variety of transformative meas-
ures. This is also been seen as unquestioningly possible; no state or society is too far
                                                                                                                                                   
between the Sinhalese on the one hand and the Tamil-speaking communities – i.e. all the non-Sinhala com-
munities, on the other; this is the so-called ‘50-50’ idea), the post-independence Federal Party (seeking
power-sharing between two federal entities, based on Tamil and Sinhala homelands in the Northeast and the
South respectively) and, later, the TULF and LTTE, seeking two independent states (ibid.).
10 Sometimes said to be based on a ‘mytho-history’ narrative outlined most vividly in the Mahavamsa – ‘Great
chronicles’, this rationality has been summarized thus: “the Sinhalese majority regards the new [post-
independence] nation as a space that properly belongs to itself, one in which purportedly various but lesser
outsiders ought to know their place” (Krishna 1999, 57, insert added). See especially Kapferer (1988) and
Gunawardana (1995), also Little (1994) and Bartholomeusz (2002).
11 As an aside, it is worth noting how this also reduces ‘local ownership’ of peacebuilding effectively to privi-
leging those (thought to be) subscribing to liberal peace over those (seen to be) opposing it.
12 For example, the relatively small, overtly Sinhala nationalist parties, the JVP and JHU, often appeared in in-
ternational analysis as the sole custodians of such sentiment. This was erroneous as their hostility to power-
sharing resonated strongly with, arguably, the majority of Sinhala voters and was manifest in media, civil so-
ciety agitation and so on. In other words, the adoption of Sinhala nationalist policies and rhetoric by main-
stream parties deemed to be ‘pro-peace’ were not taken as consequential. All Sinhala parties swiftly rejected
federalism in the twilight of the peace process.
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beyond the pale to be engaged and transformed into this ideal, the only question being
how this is to be done. What is clear in this conception is, firstly, that armed challenge
to a state, even in “situations of repressive or divisive governance” (OECD 2001, 62),
is not acceptable; and secondly, the territorial integrity of the state is inviolable, no
matter how popular internal demands for self-determination may be or how problem-
atic the state’s conduct towards a section of its citizenry.13 As such, apart from the
state, any actors who have the capacity for organized violence are an anathema and,
rather than the logics of racial hierarchy/equality embedded in a conflict system, it is
the presence or existence of these actors which constitutes the locus of ‘conflict’. The
attendant, but implicit, question is how the state, as problematic as its governance may
be, is to be bolstered against violent challenges to its authority.
All this has specific consequences for how analysis of ‘internal’ conflicts is ap-
proached. In 2001, Sri Lanka appeared – a priori – as a democratic multi-ethnic state
struggling to overcome its economic inequalities and unite its people in the face of
‘competing nationalisms’ (Goodhand 2001) and an armed challenge from the Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In this frame, the main obstacle on the path to
peace (read economic development and electoral democracy) becomes conflict itself,
and by extension, the LTTE and its ‘separatist’ struggle. In contrast, the Sri Lankan
state was straightforwardly conceptualized as a central agent for peace, and thus de-
serving of robust and multi-faceted international support. However, an alternative un-
derstanding of the state and the conflict, one which resonates more clearly with un-
folding dynamics today, is summarized by Camilla Orjuela:
“Sri Lanka could be seen as a textbook example of an ethnic conflict, where economic, political
and cultural deprivation and grievances of a minority have provoked a violent rebellion against a
state that has come to be seen as representative of only the majority ethnic group” (2003, 198,
emphasis added).
The point here is the centrality of the ethnopolitical dynamics of the Sri Lankan con-
flict, something which is often backgrounded amid a focus on ‘conflict actors’, ‘armed
groups’ and ‘security’. The discriminatory policies of successive post-independence
Sinhala-dominated governments and the concomitant embedding of majoritarianism in
state structures has been discussed in several scholarly works (see for example Bose
1994; Krishna 1999; Bartholomeusz 2002; De Votta 2004) and occasionally in some
donor studies (World Bank 2003; JBIC 2003) and will not be expanded on here.14 It
suffices to note here that, as scholarly literature sets out in detail, the post-
independence state has long been engaged in the pursuit of a political vision of the is-
land that is at odds with the liberal peace. Nonetheless, in 2001 not only was the ‘lib-
eral peace’ clearly the goal of the Norwegian-led initiative, the state was understood by
international actors as a willing agent of liberal peace (Goodhand/Klem 2005, 65, 67-
68).
                                                          
13 Even the UN-established International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), looking
at situations where external interventions which violate state sovereignty may be warranted by the conduct of
the state concerned, warns that any external intervention should not encourage demands for secession and,
indeed, even intervention based on the ‘responsibility to protect’ can only be on the premise that such de-
mands are rejected (ICISS 2001, 25).
14 We have reviewed much of this extensive literature and critically analysed the assumptions inherent to 2001-
2006 international intervention in Sri Lanka elsewhere (see Nadarajah/Vimalarajah 2008).
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This chapter does not take a normative position on ‘liberal peace’ itself, but instead
argues that taking its tenets for granted engenders a number of specific, and often erro-
neous, assumptions when it comes to analysis of conflicts in the global South: firstly,
that these conflicts are largely closed, more-or-less localized systems (i.e. conflict dy-
namics are internally produced and sustained); secondly, what constitutes peace (by
which we don’t necessarily mean ‘the political solution’) is self-evident and that this is
universally understood; thirdly, external intervention in these conflict systems is not
only desirable, but also possible (i.e. liberal peace can indeed be ‘made’ by outside ac-
tion); fourthly, foreign analysts and interveners are, by definition, external to the con-
flict itself and therefore clear-eyed and, apart from being committed to ‘peace’, are
objective; fifthly, that interveners remain external to the conflict system even after their
interventions begin; and sixthly, that the solution interveners advocate would resolve
the conflict if only they were steadfast in ensuring conflict actors to go along with it.
As Goetschel and Hagmann (2009, 61) point out,
“three of the most prominent ‘peace orthodoxies’ of civilian peacebuilding concern the tacit as-
sumptions that peace is an uncontested idea, that peace can be achieved by dint of planned bu-
reaucratic interventions and that liberal democracy equals peace.”
We do not, of course, intend to exhaustively examine or offer remedies for these prob-
lems. Rather, we seek to demonstrate that systemic analysis, undertaken with explicit
and critical awareness of these assumptions as informing external intervention and
analysis, can engender more productive, if sometimes unpalatable, understandings of
conflicts. Such self-conscious analysis can also make possible critical appraisal of ‘so-
lutions’ and interventions to produce them that are otherwise held to be both self-
evidently appropriate and viable.
3. Abstraction, Mental Models and Power
Any analysis, including those based on systemic thinking, constitutes a process of ab-
straction, inference and deduction by which sense can be made of the complex web of
interactions that comprise a conflict site. In this sense, systemic approaches, which
seek to capture the totality of the interactions that constitute a conflict, undoubtedly
promise greater analytical completeness than conventional approaches that focus on,
for example, the supposed ‘interests’ or claimed ‘ideologies’ of the main protagonists.
Nonetheless, in any analysis, as Sankaran Krishna points out, “abstraction is never in-
nocent of power. The precise […] abstraction in each instance decides what aspects of
a limitless reality are brought into sharp focus and what aspects are, literally, left out of
the picture” (2001, 403). As Krishna also argues, the point is not whether to abstract or
not – “it is an unavoidable moment in the constitution of knowledge” – but rather, “to
be vigilant as to what abstraction simultaneously conceals as it reveals” (ibid.). We ar-
gue that the mere privileging of conflict actors’ ‘mental models’ and the use of ‘con-
flict maps’ (see discussion of both in Ropers 2008) in systemic thinking does not lessen
this risk even if this improves the possibility of analytical completeness. The systemic
analyst, like any other, has to contend with the plethora of claims, counter-claims, evi-
dences and propaganda that underpin the discursive contestations within which people
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fight and die. Our point is that, like any other observer, systemic analysts also bring to
bear their own conceptual frameworks, value-judgements and a priori ‘common-sense’
that are just as contingent and socially constructed as those of the actors embedded
within the conflict system. As Peter Senge points out,
“mental models are conceptual structures in the mind that drive cognitive processes of under-
standing. They influence people’s actions because they mould people’s appreciation of what they
see. People therefore observe selectively. Mental models most often invisibly define our relation-
ship with each other and with the world in which we find ourselves. Limiting the vision of what
can be done. They hold back learning by restricting possible ways of conceptualising things.
Mental models occupy our mind and shape our actions and are based on assumptions about real-
ity” (cited in Flood 1999, 22).
Of course it is not a revelation that analysts have ‘mental models’ too. Rather, our point
is that these shape their work and its output. Crucially, as noted above, this is not just a
problem of how peace is conceptualized, but also how the analysis of the conflict itself
is approached in the first place. Analysis, even in the service of ‘peace’, is therefore not
immune from Krishna’s reminder that “the precise nature of our abstractions depends
on the productive ends toward which they are deployed” (2001, 403). Consider, for ex-
ample, how analysts go about sorting local actors into binary categories such as ‘pro-
peace’/‘spoiler’ or ‘moderate’/‘extremist’. Thus, despite international actors’ – and es-
pecially analysts’ – often explicit intention of ‘not taking sides’, this does not mean
their actions do not come to have this result, especially when they set out to pursue a
specific outcome (federalism, say) as a self-evident basis for building ‘liberal peace’.
The international intervention in Sri Lanka has been described by one study as a
“more robust and multi-faceted international response to conflict and peace dynamics
than has historically been the case” (Goodhand/Klem 2005, 10). Despite over two dec-
ades of protracted conflict and three earlier decades of intensifying ethnopolitical strife,
Sri Lanka was held to be a self-evident opportunity for “an internationally supported
success story in liberal peacebuilding” (ibid., 67). This robust, multi-faceted interven-
tion also implied substantial investment in studying the conflict, its drivers and dy-
namics for peace.15 Notably, these analyses were undertaken in a specific context of “a
comprehensive [international] programme of peace support in Sri Lanka” (Ropers
2008, 3, insert added), of which they were a key part. Moreover, the unfolding interna-
tional intervention – a ‘more robust and multi-faceted’ one than before – centred
around the production of a federal Sri Lanka as a commonsensical ‘compromise’ solu-
tion to a conflict between two extremes: a unitary state and two independent ones.16
Given the differing understandings of the conflict held by those on the island, federal-
ism – particularly without elaboration of its specific form – was not necessarily capable
of addressing what they differently considered the core issues to be. Nonetheless, in the
early days of the peace process, the idea that federalism was the ideal, indeed the only
                                                          
15 For example, donors funded two ‘Strategic Conflict Assessments’ (Goodhand 2001; Goodhand/Klem 2005).
Notably for the discussion here, a pronounced effort was also undertaken to apply systemic thinking to mak-
ing the transformation of internal conflicts more effective (Ropers 2008, 2).
16 Kelleher and Taulbee (2005, 71) quote a Norwegian deputy foreign minister on Norway’s role as facilitators:
“As facilitator, Norway’s role is to assist the parties in their efforts to reach a political solution. A significant
part of our effort focuses on promoting understanding between the parties: we spend much of our time acting
as a channel of communication and helping them to find common ground between their respective positions.”
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solution was widely accepted and forcefully promoted by international actors, includ-
ing powerful Western states and associated NGOs, organizations and agencies.
In this context, any analysis of the conflict was plausible insofar as it contributed to
the case for federalism. Arguments that questioned the efficacy of federalism or drew
other conclusions were discounted as not credible or even marginalized as not ‘pro-
peace’. Our point is how even attempts at applying systemic thinking to Sri Lanka do
not transcend this orthodoxy. For example, Nobert Ropers (2008), in an otherwise in-
sightful paper engaging with the field of systemic thinking alongside a detailed reflec-
tion on the Norwegian-led peace initiative in Sri Lanka, nonetheless bases his analysis
on a conventional understanding of the conflict i.e. as one of two competing goals or,
as he sees it, solutions: a unitary state and two independent states.17 Also convention-
ally, he attributes these ‘positions’ respectively to the “[Sri Lankan] government as
well as the majority of Sinhala mainstream parties”, on the one hand, and “the Tamil
nationalist parties and particularly the LTTE” on the other (ibid., 19). The compromise
‘solution’ to the conflict is held to be located somewhere between these extremes. The
significance of this line of reasoning is amplified when Ropers argues that “by starting
from solutions rather than causes, this [systemic] analysis [has] brought to light new
creative options” (ibid., 3, emphasis, inserts added). It is worth noting again how the
identification of a particular ‘solution’ must presuppose a particular understanding of
the ‘problem’.
This is the thrust of our argument: although Ropers’ paper seeks to engage,
amongst other things, with “the structural and contextual features which influence the
conflict and determine its dynamics” and with “parties’ understanding of the conflict
and their needs for conflict resolution” (ibid.), it does so in ways that are deeply rooted
in the values of the liberal peace. The ‘creative options’ Ropers’ analysis brought to
light, for example, do not include the possibility of two independent states being an ac-
ceptable solution to the conflict’s core issues but as one clearly on the limits – because
it is one of two furthest from ‘compromise’. Furthermore, the limits between which
compromise is framed are the stated goals of the two main protagonists (the Sri Lankan
state and the LTTE). In other words, even this effort at systemic analysis has not gone
beyond the basic assumptions which frame conventional analyses of Sri Lanka.
In other words, rather than taking seriously the ‘structural and contextual features’
that led to the eruption of violence in the first place, Ropers’ analysis effectively
frames the conflict primarily in terms of the main protagonists – a conceptualization
made explicit in his uncritical adoption of the tetralemma schematic. Firstly, it is what
the main protagonists demand, and their relative power, that decides the framework for
understanding the potential solution, rather than the underlying ‘structural and contex-
tual features’. Using the tetralemma to visualize the respective demands of the conflict
parties, moreover, serves to further write out the dynamism and the multiplicity of con-
flict issues; the conflict is reduced to the sole contradiction between the state and the
LTTE. In other words, analysis still centres on the most powerful actors, rather than the
structural factors which led to their emergence. As the brief outline of the underlying
                                                          
17 This categorization is extended to the numerous other actors in the conflict system by these positions being
elaborated thus: “only a sustained unitary state or a moderate version of devolution is an acceptable” solution
to the former, while “only a high level of (internal) self-determination or the creation of a separate state” to
the latter (Ropers 2008, 18).
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rationalities and their reproduction through myriad routine daily practices suggests, the
presence of one or other actor (with the exception of the state), does not explain a pro-
tracted conflict. The point is underscored today, in the wake of the military defeat of
the LTTE: if it was the structural features of the conflict that led to federalism being
the ‘ideal’ solution in 2001, then this must be the case even after the defeat of the
LTTE, but today there are almost no international actors prepared to even mention the
term federalism, let alone call for this solution. In other words, if structural drivers are
taken seriously, then firstly, the defeat of the LTTE will lead not to peace, but to a
pause in violence followed by the emergence of a new militancy and another round of
conflict; and secondly, unless the drivers of conflict have changed, federalism must
still be the ‘right’ solution. In this context, it is worth recalling how in liberal peace
terms, it is the armed challenge of the LTTE itself that was considered the primary ob-
stacle to peace.
What is not seriously engaged with, even if competing ‘discourses’ (Frerks/Klem
2004) are enumerated, is why ‘extreme’ constitutional goals (a unitary Sri Lanka and
an independent Tamil Eelam) are being sought by local actors. In other words, for their
advocates, what are these two constitutional forms meant to serve? What use are they
over other forms, what problems are they meant to solve for their advocates, and what
aspirations do they embody? Until such questions are answered, a unitary state or an
independent state are merely abstract political forms; and the explicit goals of the pro-
tagonists come to be taken, as in Ropers’ analysis, as the self-evident ends of conflict
between which ‘compromise’ is to be made (i.e. the specific purpose or benefit of these
‘solutions’ for their protagonists then become irrelevant to analysis and are possibly a
matter of speculation). In other words, unless these contextualizing questions are posed
and answered by analysts, the real ‘drivers of conflict’ become all too easily masked by
the analysis itself.
Conclusion
Systemic analysis undertaken with an awareness of the liberal peace biases of interna-
tional interveners and analysts could have brought to the fore crucial reasons why fed-
eralism, then regarded by international actors as an ‘ideal’ solution for Sri Lanka’s
protracted conflict, actually exacerbated rather than attenuated the crisis. Single-
minded international promotion of federalism as a commonsense ‘compromise’ solu-
tion to Sri Lanka’s protracted ethnopolitical contradictions was not only based on erro-
neous assumptions about the contradictions underlying the conflict, but in itself con-
stituted a heavy-handed intervention that destabilized the delicate ‘no war, no peace’
disequilibrium that had emerged with the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement. In other words, a
close examination of Sri Lanka’s conflict dynamics, which went deeper than a focus on
the two main protagonists’ stated goals and looked at the rationales within which an
independent state and a unitary state are sought and fought for, would have predicted
the futility of raising a non-specific federalism as a solution and, especially, applying
international pressure for it to be accepted. To be clear, we are not saying federalism is
not a solution to Sri Lanka’s crisis, but rather that unless the protagonists understand-
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ings of the conflict and, especially, lasting peace are engaged with, the pursuit of an
abstract notion of federalism can be expected to trigger intense resistance from both
‘sides’, albeit through different logics. This is not to advocate one form of federalism
over another, but to argue that international interventions cannot hope to produce last-
ing ‘peace’ unless they explicitly address these competing political rationalities (Nada-
rajah 2010). Our call here is not against international intervention per se, nor for a
normative rejection of the fundamentals of liberal peace (i.e. liberal democracy and
market economics). But we ask for a more nuanced, self-conscious, pragmatic, and
thus effective international action based on a thorough understanding of a given con-
flict’s complex history, its interrelated variables, the mental models of internal and ex-
ternal actors, the dominant political rationalities in the conflict zone, the legacy of past
peace initiatives (such as earlier efforts to raise federalism in Sri Lanka) and, espe-
cially, the considerable impact of the prevailing international environment of the time.
Setting aside the many claims of their hidden reasons, it is clear from international
actors’ efforts towards ‘making peace’ in Sri Lanka that their understandings of the
conflict’s underlying dynamics were deeply flawed and, crucially for the arguments
presented here, were driven by prevailing orthodoxies concerning liberal peace, what
prevents its genesis, and how it should be yet brought about. To arrive at more nuanced
understandings of conflicts like Sri Lanka’s, therefore, analysts, including systemic
thinkers, must reflect on their own assumptions and value-systems, and thus critically
question their own roles and impact within the conflict system. What appears unprob-
lematically, even commonsensically, to be a compromise solution for a given conflict
may, with good reasons – in their own logics –  not be seen as such by local actors who
are often operating in different political rationalities to that of the analyst. What appear,
or are claimed to be, the bases for the conflict may mask the deep-rooted crises of an-
tagonistic identities, contested territories and power differentials that can only be re-
vealed by a detailed analysis that takes account of the analyst’s own mental model. As
such, even the assumption that there is a compromise solution and all that is required
for peace is to identify it is also questionable: what appear to be zero-sum dynamics
can be precisely that.
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